The German planning process for the 1941 invasion of Soviet Russia is analyzedthrough the presentation of the major plans developed from 1940 until June 1941. The final plan is then critiqued within the context of the applicable principles of war.
A set of conclusio s is presented which argues that the planning process was faulty due to a number of assumptions which were generally held by the officers who were involved in the process. Germans failed to achieve their goals, there is a general consensus regarding the incorrect assumptions held by the planners as they progressed through the process.
The reader should be aware that not all of the Principles of War are discussed during the critique portion of the study. Only the most relevant principles are discussed In order to provide proper analysis. The campaign planners utilized a number of these principles to their benefit, and others they chose to ignore (or so it seems).
It should also be pointed out that scholars disagree on the exact personal interactions which took place during the planning and execution phases of the campaign. It is at times difficult to ascertain how much influence a particular actor had upon Hitler during the process. There is also disagreement on the motives which resulted in Hitler deciding to carry out the invasion. Explanations include racism and economic motivations. Whatever the reasons were, the decision to invade Soviet Russia In 1941, initiated a sequence of events which finally resulted in the destruction of the Third Reich.
iii The purpose of this study is to examine the planning phases of Operation Barbarossa from July 1940 until the campaign was begun In June 1941. The planning process will then be analyzed within the framework of a number of the Principles of War. A set of conclusions will then be presented which will emphasize the reasons for the failure of the planning process.
(n a general sense, it can be maintained that the failure of this campaign was the result of the misapplication of operational art during the planning phase, and later during the execution phase of the campaign.
Barbarossa is also the story of conflict, disagreement and struggles for The aforementioned circumstances provide a brief background regarding the major events which took place during the planning process for Barbarossa. Hitler most certrainly had a variety of strategic choices available to him. Although he opted to become involved in Greece and
Crete, there is no doubt that his top priority during this time was the planning and execution of the plan to destroy Soviet Russia. The planning process for Operation Barbarossa shall now be discussed. This problem can be related to the second which is a general assumption maintained by most of the German military leadership. Due to the Nazis' inherent belief in their military superiority, and dismally inadequete intelligence regarding Soviet military capabilities, the leadership assumed the war would be short and decisive. After all however, success breeds confidence.
These two phenomena were further complicated by the relationship between the OKW (German High Command), and the OKH (Army General Staff). While it has been well documented that there was a rivalry between these two organizations, this explanation is too simplistic regarding the planning process for Barbarossa (see Only after these objectives were secured, or in the event of a massive Soviet military collapse, was the thrust to continue to Moscow. <16>
The respective missions of the Luftwaffe and the Navy were also discussed in this directive. The Luftwaffe was to gain air superiority and to provide close air support for the ground forces. The Navy was directed to seal off the Baltic Sea in order to prevent the Soviet Navy from escaping. Hitler thought that once Leningrad was taken, the Soviet Navy would be rendered ineffective due to the lack of a logistical base. <17>
Hitler also directed that in order to ensure the security of the The question of OBJECTIVE is most certainly one of the major problems which contributed to the defeat of Germany. From the beginning of the planning phase, and well Into the execution phase, the campaign was characterized by a lack of agreement in this area.
What was the decisive center of gravity; Leningrad, the Ukraine, the Synchronization and phasing are also related to another question. How effective were the Germans in allocating their forces vis a vis the enemy in order to achieve their strategic goals? The answer here goes back to early in the planning process and is related to ECONOMY OF FORCE issues.
As we have seen, the deployment of three army groups resulted in complex coordination problems. The German planners were never able to properly analyze the Pripyat Marsh problem. Even early plans divided the forces into at least two groups. As the process matured, the indecision regarding objectives made the issue more complex.
The United States Army defines economy of force as the capability to:
"Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts." <25> The problem here is that the Germans planned for too many primary objectives.
As the operation progressed, Hitler found himself peeling off panzer groups to assist other army groups. It seems that he wanted to go everywhere at once. This problem was further complicated by the fact that by the summer of 1941, Germany was unable to properly replenish its divisions due to low reserves and a high attrition rate.
Despite the historical failure of the campaign, the planners did utilize a number of the principles in an effective manner. The initial portion of the execution phase did result in some spectacular successes for Germany.
Some of this success can be directly attributed to German efforts to maneuver In an area which was twenty times larger than the French battlef eld. In this respect, the time/space problem negated maneuver effectiveness.
The above discussion of the German use of some of the relevant Principles of War discloses several issues. First, the lack of unity of command in conjunction with unclear objectives, resulted in an ineffectual campaign plan. As Barbarossa developed over the summer and fall of 1941, these shortcomings became obvious and resulted in a series of reevaluations which resulted in a revision of the initial plan (see Figure   6 for a graphic presentation of the campaign from June to December 1941).
While the revision of ar, extensive plan such as Barbarossa is not necessarily Improper, the "Hitler factor" should be considered. As the campaign progressed, he became more and more involved In the daily planning process. This resulted in frustration on the part of his generals, and added a considerable amount of confusion to the process. The result was stagnation by December of 1941, and complete defeat by 1945.
On the other hand, the Germans planned for and utilized some of the principles such as suprise and maneuver very successfully. They were tactically superior to the Red Army and had better leadership. In other areas however, such as supply and their reserve capability however, they were at a distinct disadvantage. If it can be argued that the Germans did 20 plan for and execute many portions of the campaign in a successful manner, than why were they stopped at the gates of the Moscow? One of the most accepted answers is of course, the time/space problem: Too much territory with not enough forces. But it Is more complex than that. A set of conclusions based upon German assumptions which were deeply ingrained prior to the planning process shall now be presented. C. The Insufficient outfitting of the German Army to fight a winter campaign.
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D. An underestimation regarding the spirit of the Russian population to resist (i.e. the partisan problem).
Another assumption made by the leadership regarded the objective situation. Halder and his supporters were absolutely dogmatic in the belief that Moscow was the key to a Soviet c, lapse. Hitler and some members of the OKW were just as determin.-i dn their belief that
Leningrad and the protection of Army Group Center's flanks provided the key to victory. These assumptions created an unclear strategy from the beginning. It could also be argued that these assumptions regarding the Soviet center of gravity were simply outgrowths from the overconfidence factor. After all, the campaign would be short as a result of the quality of the opposition.
This assumption of superiority also resulted In the neglect of several other phenomena which affected the outcome of the campaign. First, Barbarossa was delayed six weeks to operations in the Balkans; Second, the time/space problem was considered, but due to German expertise in the area of maneuver warfare, it was not considered to be the dominant variable. Last, although Hitler was aware of Napolean's mistakes, he expected the campaign to be completed prior to the beginning of winter.
In summary, it was not the plans which were defective, but the ASSUMPTIONS which were maintained by the planners which resulted in the failure of the process. Most certainly there were other factors such as disunity among the command organizations, but German beliefs about themselves and their enemy were the primary factors which resulted in their demise. This is an extraordinary example of how inherent beliefs and assumptions can affect the thought processes of military planners. A close look at the major plans which were discussed earlier, reveals that although objectives and force deployment projections differed, the underlying assumptions remained similar. Therefore it can be concluded that the misapplication of the Principles of War, was directly related to the maintenance of faulty assumptions. In this instance we are afforded the luxury of historical analysis. It is imperative for future planners to clear their minds of inherent prejudices and attitudes while they go about their task.
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APPENDIX I: FIGURES
